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Search Query
CAN AMERICA ACCEPT A RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN AS A PUBLICITY RIGHT?
INTRODUCTION
In 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) held that members of the European Union have a right
to be forgotten.1 As a result, everyone in Europe now has the
right to petition search engines to deindex, that is, make
unsearchable, results that contain information that is “inadequate,
irrelevant or no longer relevant.”2 The court’s decision marks a sea
change—in Europe at least—in the way data is treated on the
Internet, a digital space defined in some respect by its ability to
never forget.3 Reactions to this decision, Google Spain v. AEPD,
ranged from wholehearted endorsement,4 to more nuanced
scholarship,5 to pearl-clutching reactions.6 Ignoring the fact that
Internet does not distinguish between historical facts and lies,7 the
more alarmist of the bunch seem to view the Internet as a sort of
crowd-sourced history of the world, saying the “decision raises
1 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_print.jsf?
doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=152065&occ=first&dir=&
cid=436018 [https://perma.cc/YB9C-VHCM].
2 Id.
3 See Farhad Manjoo, ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ Online Could Spread, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/06/technology/personaltech/right-to-beforgotten-online-is-poised-to-spread.html [https://perma.cc/28KY-4XUC].
4 See Eric Posner, We All Have the Right to Be Forgotten, SLATE (May 14, 2014,
4:37 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2014/05/
the_european_right_to_be_forgotten_is_just_what_the_internet_needs.html [https://perma.cc/
U7BQ-W254].
5 See Paul de Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, How the European Google
Decision May Have Nothing To Do With a Right to Be Forgotten, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY
PROF’LS (June 19, 2014), https://iapp.org/news/a/how-the-european-google-decision-mayhave-nothing-to-do-with-a-right-to-be [https://perma.cc/A7RL-F4PT].
6 See Tessa Mayes, We Have No Right to Be Forgotten Online, GUARDIAN (Mar.
18, 2011, 10:16 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2011/
mar/18/forgotten-online-european-union-law-internet [https://perma.cc/U85W-NPNH].
7 See Craig Silverman & Jeremy Singer-Vine, Most Americans Who See Fake
News Believe It, New Survey Says, BUZZFEEDNEWS (Dec. 6, 2016, 8:31 PM),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/craigsilverman/fake-news-survey?utm_term=.fyDYd2zrJ#.ov
oybPZOm [https://perma.cc/7C9B-QBAT].
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broader questions about an Orwellian power to distort history.”8
In the United States, however, many people were scratching
their heads in the wake of the CJEU’s decision. What was this
right to be forgotten? And should we be worried?9
The answer to the latter question: maybe? Google Spain
seems to have solidified the idea of a so-called right to be
forgotten as a legal possibility in the minds of many scholars and
jurists, who have debated whether we can import the right to be
forgotten to the United States.10 Much of that debate focuses on
the different ways Europe and the United States view issues of
privacy.11 Many people note that American law places greater
value on free speech than its European counterparts, which
more often value privacy over free speech when the two conflict.12
This argument points to the historical impracticability of having
a right to be forgotten in the Unites States, and fails to account
for the realities of the present.
Search engines have profoundly changed any historical
relationship between privacy and free speech, necessitating a
reevaluation of both concepts. A post-Internet world cannot
assume easy analogies exist between laws regulating the real
world and those that regulate cyberspace, and thus a new inquiry
is required in each instance to determine if interactions in
cyberspace are “functionally identical to interactions in real
space.”13 In the realm of privacy, for example, the concept of
anonymity has been turned on its head by the interconnectivity of
the Internet. “The predigital age afforded anonymity, ‘not by law,
but by the crude state of technology.’”14 Now, “[i]nformation that
Daniel Lyons, Assessing the Right to be Forgotten, 59 BOS. B.J. 26, 28 (2015).
See Posner, supra note 4 (“The European ‘right to be forgotten’ is the most
important right you’ve never heard of.”).
10 See Posner, supra note 4 (“[T]he right to be forgotten allows courts to balance
the public’s interest in knowing [defamatory] information against the ordinary person’s
right to be left alone.”); Editorial, Ordering Google to Forget, N. Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/14/opinion/ordering-google-to-forget.html [https://
perma.cc/4MCJ-DAH2] (“[Google Spain is] a ruling that could undermine press freedoms
and free speech.”). See generally Chelsea E. Carbone, To Be or Not to Be Forgotten:
Balancing the Right to Know With the Right to Privacy In a Digital Age, 22 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & L. 525, 554–59 (2015) (discussing the legal difficulties of implementing the right
to be forgotten in the United States, especially in light of the First Amendment’s
protections for free speech).
11 See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity
Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1153–59 (2004).
12 W. Gregory Voss & Céline Castets-Renard, Proposal for an International
Taxonomy on the Various Forms of “The Right to Be Forgotten”: A Study on the
Convergence of Norms, 14 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 281, 289 (2016).
13 Joseph A. Tomain, Online Privacy & the First Amendment: An Opt-In
Approach to Data Processing, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 9 (2014) (citing David G. Post, Against
“Against Cyberanarchy,” 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1365 (2002)).
14 Lauren H. Rakower, Note, Blurred Line: Zooming in On Google Street View
and the Global Right to Privacy, 37 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 319, 326 (2011) (quoting RANDALL
8

9
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was once scattered, forgettable, and localized is becoming
permanent and searchable. . . . These transformations pose threats
to people’s control over their reputations and their ability to be who
they want to be.”15 The lack of access to anonymity does not have
an easy analogy in the non-digital world, where there are much
higher temporal and economic costs that protect information a
person might consider private. People are vulnerable in a way that
they have never been before, and the law may be able to provide a
remedy—but only if we are willing to rethink the way the law can
be adapted to new situations online.
Search engines not only necessitate a reevaluation of the
relationship between privacy and free speech, but also a
reevaluation of our conception of the Internet. One of the virtues
of the Internet is that it collects and organizes previously
scattered and disorganized information, and many people value
the Internet as a tool to keep them well-informed.16 At the same
time, however, the Internet companies that zealously “collect
and organize” their users’ data are “wreak[ing] havoc on
personal privacy.”17 But the idea of the Internet as a pure social
good has proven hard to shake in the United States, creating
dissonance between the idea of the Internet as a tool for
democratizing information and the Internet as a source of anxiety
for anyone with private information they do not want to share.
Americans largely feel the Internet is key to staying informed,18 but
at the same time, people want more control over their own
information.19 Granted, in light of the 2016 election cycle in the
United States, with its surfeit of “fake news” online that many
people believe contributed to a “great deal of confusion”
surrounding the election,20 public opinion about the Internet in
general being a valuable source of news, as opposed to strictly
reputable news sources, may be heading for a change already. But

STROSS, PLANT GOOGLE: ONE COMPANY’S AUDACIOUS PLAN TO ORGANIZE EVERYTHING
WE KNOW 145 (2008)).
15 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR AND
PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 4 (2007).
16 See Kristen Purcell & Lee Rainie, Americans Feel Better Informed Thanks
to the Internet, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/12/08/
better-informed/ [https://perma.cc/C4GT-CQPA].
17 Manjoo, supra note 3.
18 See Purcell & Rainie, supra note 16.
19 Mary Madden & Lee Rainie, Americans’ Attitudes About Privacy, Security
and Surveillance, PEW RES. CTR. (May 20, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/05/20/
americans-attitudes-about-privacy-security-and-surveillance [https://perma.cc/B5Q5-5HSY].
20 Michael Barthel, Amy Mitchell & Jesse Holcomb, Many Americans Believe
Fake News is Sowing Confusion, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.journalism.org/
2016/12/15/many-americans-believe-fake-news-is-sowing-confusion/ [https://perma.cc/
N94E-49JY].
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this note goes a step further, arguing that there are criteria for
making factual news unsearchable on a search engine.
The idea that people do not want to replicate privacy norms
online seems absurd,21 and yet courts have been surprisingly
dismissive of this privacy concern.22 Still, all is not lost. “Laws are
[rarely] fixed [or] absolute,” and tend to change in step with larger
cultural changes,23 and as indicated above, a cultural change is in
the making. When it comes to online service providers, such as
search engines, the vast majority of people do not trust them to be
guardians of information.24 This sense of insecurity is
understandable. For example, it is common practice now for
businesses and universities to search candidates’ names online even
before they consider information on an application.25 According to
recent statistics, when reviewing applications, approximately “80
percent of employers, 30 percent of universities, and 40 percent of
law schools search [for] applicants online.”26 Sometimes the
information online may be well beyond an applicant’s control and, as
the CJEU characterized it, the information may be “inadequate,
irrelevant or no longer relevant.”27
Underlying this note is a concern about “autonomy and
control over the self”28 and an evocation of a “forgiveness
principle,” which Chelsea E. Carbone characterizes as a belief in
rehabilitating people who have made mistakes in their social
and economic lives in order to give them an opportunity to
engage in socially beneficial activity.29 This kind of rehabilitation
21 See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity,
101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 15 (2013) (“Most commonly, social networks are segmented along
important network boundaries such as family, work, and public persona. Depending on
the importance of the linkage between these personas, individuals use various
techniques to ‘cloak’ personas, such as employing privacy settings, using obscure name
variants, and highly regulating the off-line disclosure of the existence of the profile.”).
22 See, e.g., Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Users would
logically lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in the materials intended for publication
or public posting.”); Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1147
(S.D. Cal. 2005) (“[O]ne cannot reasonably expect the internet posting of photos to be
private.”); United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002)
(“[P]lacing information on the information superhighway necessarily makes said matter
accessible to the public, no matter how many protectionist measures may be taken, or
even when a web page is ‘under construction.’”).
23 Sherman Young, A Hack for the Encouragement of Learning, in COPYFIGHT
35, 44 (Phillipa McGuinness ed. 2015).
24 Madden & Rainie, supra note 19.
25 Carbone, supra note 10, at 552.
26 MEG LETA JONES, CTRL + Z: THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 5 (2016).
27 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española Protección de
Datos(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶93–94 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document_print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=15206
5&occ=first&dir=&cid=436018 [https://perma.cc/YB9C-VHCM].
28 SAMANTHA BARBAS, LAWS OF IMAGE: PRIVACY AND PUBLICITY IN AMERICA 33 (2015).
29 Carbone, supra note 10, at 553 (2015).
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is more difficult when past mistakes are easily searchable
online. In Google Spain, for example, a Spanish citizen claimed
that Google “infringed his privacy rights” by showing a link to
an old auction notice for the repossession of his home, arguing
that the link “was entirely irrelevant” because the repossession
proceedings ended years ago.30 Yet, anyone could type his name
into Google and find this information immediately.31
While many scholars, jurists, and members of the media
concerned about the state of free speech maintain that a right to
be forgotten does not have any chance of being recognized in the
United States, the past decade has seen an increased interest in
data privacy protection.32 One study shows that a substantial
majority of Americans support greater restrictions on the use of
personal information online.33 There have also been a number of
bills introduced in Congress over the years that have sought to
protect people’s information online, although with varied levels
of success.34 But while legislatures and the non-media members
of the public may be on the same page, courts are faced with
warring sentiments coming from the media, the search engine
companies, and their own information privacy jurisprudence.35
Still, a court system more amenable to the idea of a right
to be forgotten would not be a substantial break from American
tradition. The United States has a complex history of privacy
and free speech that should not be discounted. Meg Leta Jones,
an assistant professor at the Center for Privacy and Technology
at the Georgetown Law Center, noted:

30 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN”
(C-131/12) (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/
factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/MHK4-VB6C].
31 Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. at ¶14.
32 See Lee Rainie, Sara Kiesler, Ruogu Kang, & Mary Madden, Anonymity,
Privacy, and Security Online, PEW RES. CTR (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2013/09/05/anonymity-privacy-and-security-online/ [https://perma.cc/9M6W-HHVQ]
(“[G]rowing numbers of internet users (50 [percent]) say they are worried about the
amount of personal information about them that is online—a figure that has jumped
from 33% who expressed such worry in 2009.”).
33 Joseph Turrow, Jennifer King, Chris Jay Hoofnatle, Ana Bleakley, &
Michael Henessy, Americans Reject Tailored Advertising and Three Activities that
Enable It, U. PA. SCHOLARLY COMMONS 3–4 (2009), https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article=1138&context=asc_papers [https://perma.cc/49A6-PX6A].
34 See, e.g., Email Privacy Act, H.R. 387, 115th Cong. (2017) (passed the House
on February 6, 2017 and goes to Senate next for consideration); BROWSER Act, H.R.
2520, 115th Cong. (2017) (introduced into Congress on May 18, 2017); Application
Privacy, Protection, and Security Act, H.R. 1913, 113th Cong. (2013) (introduced but not
enacted in a previous session of Congress); Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 580,
114th Cong. (2015) (introduced but not enacted in a previous session of Congress).
35 Mark Bartholomew, Intellectual Property’s Lessons for Information Privacy,
92 NEB. L. REV. 746, 749 (2014); see also infra Part II.
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The U.S. has an interesting intersection of laws, interests, and values
related to a right to be forgotten. Part of patriotic lore is the notion
that the country was built by people seeking a second chance and
hoping for reinvention. The United States—the presumed “land of
opportunity”—is itself a product of second chances and has allowed
individuals and groups to break free from their past to prosper. Those
who were negatively labeled in Europe came to America to start a new
life . . . . Today, however, U.S. society appears harsh.36

Part of adapting the right to be forgotten to the American legal
system then involves confronting this complex issue to make a
value judgment based on what we ultimately think is important
as a society.
This note argues that framing the right to be forgotten in
terms of a publicity right instead of a privacy right would be a
better way to conceptualize the right in the United States. Part
I defines the right to be forgotten. Part II gives a brief overview
of the current debate over the right to be forgotten in the United
States, with a focus on why existing common law privacy torts
are an inadequate counterpoint to First Amendment free speech
rights. Part III looks at the right to publicity and the advantages
of conceptualizing a right to be forgotten in terms of a publicity
right. Part IV examines whether a link on a search engine can
fairly be characterized as a “commercial end,” which is essential
to a successful right of publicity claim. Part V examines how
exactly a right to be forgotten characterized as a publicity right
would work in the American legal system.
I.

DEFINING THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN

Several definitions exist for “the right to be forgotten,”
but this note only deals with a specific definition with a narrow
application: the right to have a link deindexed from a search
engine.37 This note does not suggest that the analysis for this
specific definition is applicable to any other definition of the
right to be forgotten. While a list of all the different rights to be
forgotten38 is not necessary here, it is helpful to distinguish the
narrow definition of the right to be forgotten with some of the
broader definitions that the term might suggest.
The right to rehabilitation, also sometimes called “the
right to oblivion of the judicial past,” may factor into the analysis
JONES, supra note 26, at 139.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española Protección de
Datos(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶11 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_
print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=152065&occ=firs
t&dir=&cid=436018 [https://perma.cc/YB9C-VHCM].
38 For a complete list, see Voss & Castets-Renard, supra note 12, at 338–40.
36

37
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of the right to deindex but is ultimately a separate right.39 The
right to rehabilitation recognizes that a person convicted of a
criminal offense may have their criminal record expunged if they
have shown good behavior for a period of time following their
conviction.40 As discussed later in this note, whether or not a
person can successfully exercise a right to rehabilitation may
factor into whether someone may exercise their right to be
forgotten, since it may be relevant whether the person is seeking
to deindex a link in order “to better reintegrate into society”41—
something Americans ostensibly value. Still, it does not follow
that just because a conviction has been removed from someone’s
criminal record that the individual automatically has a right to
deindex that information from search engines.42
Also distinct from the right to be forgotten is the right to
deletion, which for this note’s purposes does not factor into the
analysis of the right to deindex but does factor into conceptualizing
an important distinction between “unavailable” information and
“unsearchable” information. The right to deindex a link removes a
link from search engines’ results, making it unsearchable on that
specific platform, but preserves the online source.43 For example, a
person may have a link from the New York Times deindexed from
Google’s search results, but anyone can still search and find the
link on the New York Times website. A right to deletion, however,
requires source material on a website to be “erased, rectified,
completed or amended.”44 In the debate surrounding the right to be
forgotten, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between
deletion and deindexing.45 The former erases the information from
the digital record, and since that may be the only version that
Id. at 299.
Id.
41 David J. Stute, Note, Privacy Almighty? The CJEU’s Judgment in Google
Spain SL v. AEPD, 36 MICH. J. INT’L 649, 669 (2015).
42 ARTICLE 29 WORKING PARTY, GUIDELINES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION JUDGMENT ON “GOOGLE SPAIN AND INC V.
AGENCIA ESPANOLA DE DATOS (AEPD) AND MARIO COSTEJA GONZALEZ” C-131/12 at 12
(2014) [hereinafter GUIDELINES] http://www.dataprotection.ro/servlet/ViewDocument
?id=1080 [https://perma.cc/ER8M-7B7J] (“In most cases, it appears that more than one
criterion will need to be taken into account in order to reach a decision. In other words,
no single criterion is, in itself, determinative.”).
43 See Voss & Castets-Renard, supra note 12, at 326.
44 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., https://www.oecd.org/sti/
ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.h
tm [https://perma.cc/5TA6-PZUV].
45 Evan Selinger & Woodrow Hartzog, Google Can’t Forget You, but It Should
Make You Hard to Find, WIRED (May 20, 2014, 3:33 PM), https://www.wired.com/
2014/05/google-cant-forget-you-but-it-should-make-you-hard-to-find/ [https://perma.cc/
W6TW-K8RX] (“The differences between recall and discovery, invisibility and nonexistence need to be salient in this debate.”).
39

40
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exists, it erases any trace of the information.46 The latter merely
makes a very small amount of information more difficult to find,
which is essential to a culture, such as the United States, that
values second chances and reinvention.47 Commentators who liken
deindexing with a license to rewrite history48 are conflating the
right to deletion with the right to deindex. Deindexing does not
delete anything from the historical record; the information is still
available to anyone with the time, resources, and expertise to
develop a history of a topic.
The right to deindex derives from a 2014 CJEU decision;
the facts of the decision are nearly paradigmatic of the type that
would fall within the scope of the right to be forgotten as envisioned
in this note.49 The case, Google Spain v. AEPD, involved a Spanish
newspaper which published two announcements in 1998,
subsequently made available online, about a real-estate auction to
collect on social security debts owed by a Spanish lawyer named
Mario Costeja Gonzalez.50 In 2009, Mr. Costeja Gonzalez, noting
that these announcements showed up in Google’s search results
when he typed in his name, asked Google Spain to remove the
results.51 He presented to the court a theory that because the
auction proceedings had been resolved more than a decade prior,
they were no longer relevant.52 On May 13, 2014, the CJEU held
that Google Spain, and by extension all search engine operators in
the EU, must observe an individual “right to be forgotten.”53 In the
wake of that decision, any EU citizen may petition any search
46 See Tom Worstall, Newspapers Going Digital Only, FORBES (Jan. 26, 2012,
10:05 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2012/01/26/newspapers-goingdigital-only/#16a0c78b5e01 [https://perma.cc/TW4X-C8MX].
47 JONES, supra note 26, at 139.
48 Victor Luckerson, Americans Will Never Have the Right to Be Forgotten,
TIME (May 14, 2014), http://time.com/98554/right-to-be-forgotten [https://perma.cc/
U6QA-9H8W] (“The surprising decision, which Google can’t directly appeal, is either a
bold reclamation of privacy rights in the digital era or a mandate to let anyone rewrite
history as they please, depending on your perspective.”).
49 There is some debate over whether the CJEU decided the case correctly, as well
as some arguments that the decision was too vague, but these concerns are largely irrelevant
to this note’s discussion and moreover the case serves as a useful reference point.
50 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española Protección de
Datos(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶14 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_
print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=152065&occ=firs
t&dir=&cid=436018 [https://perma.cc/YB9C-VHCM]. See David Streitfeld, European
Court Lets Users Erase Records on Web, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2014), https://www.ny
times.com/2014/05/14/technology/google-should-erase-web-links-to-some-personal-dataeuropes-highest-court-says.html [https://perma.cc/EVN2-H959].
51 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española Protección de
Datos(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶15 http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_
print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=152065&occ=firs
t&dir=&cid=436018 [https://perma.cc/YB9C-VHCM].
52 Id.
53 Id. at ¶91, 100.
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engine to remove indexed links that contain information that is
“inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant.”54 This standard,
which is decidedly vague, has been expanded upon in subsequent
administrative guidelines55 and in analyses exploring how this
standard might be adapted for the American legal system.
II.

THE CURRENT DEBATE IN AMERICA

The Google Spain decision not only pushed the right to
deindex into American legal discourse,56 but it also clarified
problematic privacy jurisprudence. Scholarly work has
consistently made it clear that attempts to define the contours of
the right in the United States have been unsuccessful, making it a
poor match for the free speech concerns that the right implicates.57
This Part surveys the scholarly work surrounding the
debate about privacy and free speech that the Google Spain
decision engendered in the United States. The first Section gives
a brief overview of the theoretical debate over privacy and free
speech. The second Section examines why, as a practical matter,
the United States has failed to come up with a useful definition
for the right to privacy, ultimately concluding that, as it now
stands, privacy torts are inadequate protections against the
harms caused by irrelevant-but-prejudicial links. The third
Section explains that search engines are benign or benevolent
stakeholders in the privacy versus free speech on the Internet
debate, and urges consideration of their interests in
perpetuating a business model that manipulates the debate for
their own economic ends.
A.

Privacy Versus Free Speech

Privacy law has been in conflict with free speech
principles since the beginning of American mass media culture,
“and when First Amendment values and . . . privacy conflict,”
the First Amendment almost always wins.58 Although the
“freedom of speech” is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,59 the laws
Id. at ¶ 94.
See GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 12–20; see also infra Part V.
56 See Posner, supra note 4.
57 See generally Robert G. Larson III, Forgetting the First Amendment: How
Obscurity-Based Privacy and a Right to Be Forgotten Are Incompatible With Free Speech,
18 COMM. L. & POL’Y 91 (2013) (arguing that First Amendment protections for free speech
in the United States fundamentally conflict with the European privacy-based social
norms that gave rise to a legal right to be forgotten).
58 See Neil M. Richards, The Limits of Tort Privacy, 9 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 357, 357 (2011); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 531 (1989).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
54

55
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protecting this fundamental right as a cornerstone of American
life only began in earnest a century later when the Supreme
Court incorporated the First Amendment, applying its
protections to the states.60 Incorporation happened at about the
same time privacy rights began to gain more attention.61 This is
not surprising given that mass media culture in the United
States began around the end of the nineteenth century,
thrusting questions of both free speech and privacy into a newly
nationalized public sphere.62 But since privacy law is derived
from statutes, common law, and an implicit guarantee in the Bill
of Rights, whereas free speech finds its source in an explicit
provision of the Constitution, it is not surprising that the scales
have historically tipped in favor of free speech.
Looking at the history of privacy first, the law has provided
increased protections against new problems associated with mass
media. This holds true for every major development in mass media
culture since the late nineteenth century to now.63 For example,
scholars attribute “a surge of [successful] libel lawsuits” brought by
non-public figures in the late nineteenth century to the at-the-time
novel phenomenon of ordinary people becoming subjects of press
coverage in a new culture of “sensationalistic press and ‘human
interest’ journalism.”64 This pattern repeated in the interwar years
with the proliferation of national news, radio, and film, and then
again in the 1950s with the advent of consumer culture and
widespread home-ownership of televisions.65 But it was not until
the “privacy panic” of the 1950s—spurred by McCarthy-era
technological advances in spy technology and government
surveillance, and continuing throughout the next decade during
the civil rights movement and the Vietnam War66—that the privacy
tort really took off in U.S. courts, partially as the result of the
metastasizing mass media culture, but also as part of a more
general “expansion of tort liability and litigation.”67

60 See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 625, 630 (1925) (“For present purposes we
may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press—which are protected by the
First Amendment from abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal
rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
from impairment by the States.”).
61 See BARBAS, supra note 28 at 15–17 (discussing the increasing frequency of
libel and defamation lawsuits at the turn of the 20th century).
62 See id.
63 See id.
64 See id.
65 See id. at 103, 105, 152–53.
66 See id. at 184.
67 See id. at 178.
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The apotheosis of privacy law in the United States is, of
course, Griswold v. Connecticut,68 a 1965 case that both illustrates
the importance of privacy rights as well as the rickety scaffolding
supporting them. In Griswold, the Supreme Court held that people
have a fundamental right to privacy that derives from certain
“penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees [of the
Bill of Rights] that help give them life and substance.”69 The Court
cited the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments as
creating a sort of privacy gestalt, which finds no explicit support in
the Bill of Rights but which nevertheless confers a fundamental
right.70 As a fundamental right, the right to privacy grants strong
protections to individuals. But as a fundamental right that is merely
implicit within the Bill of Rights, the right to privacy is diminished
in the face of the right to free speech—an explicitly stated
fundamental right. This tension has been carried out in practice.71
The Supreme Court decided Griswold at a time when free
speech and privacy laws had already been at loggerheads for
decades. Similar to privacy law, free speech became an integral
feature of public discourse at the turn of the nineteenth century
and came into its own in the post-World War II, post-second red
scare era,72 at which point the two rights were bound to come into
conflict. Since freedom of speech and the right to privacy arose from
the same concerns over technologies of information dissemination
and cultural shifts towards celebrity, personality, and
consumerism, this paradox of two diametrically opposed ideals
becoming core American values around the same time makes
sense. Even though it makes sense, one cannot dismiss the tension
between these values in American life. In her book on the history
of privacy law, Samantha Barbas points out, “[a] public so
committed to privacy was at the same time remarkably sanguine
about its loss. The culture seemed to crave privacy yet at the same
time recognized the incompatibility of privacy with modern life,
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484 (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 516–22 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting)).
70 See id.
71 Whitman, supra note 11, at 1209.
72 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (“[T]he constitutional
guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy
of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.”); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 301 (1964) (quoting De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)
(“[I]mperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free speech, free
press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free political discussion, to
the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes, if
desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein lies the security of the Republic, the
very foundation of constitutional government.”)).
68

69
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with its demands for disclosure and exposure.”73 This tension,
which has a profound impact on the United States’ ambivalence
towards the right to be forgotten, continues into the digital age,
with Barbas saying that:
While the public claims to resent the media’s exploitation of personal
reputation and privacy, it loves to watch people’s images destroyed or
dismantled before mass audience. We want to reveal ourselves. . . . But—
as ever—we seek publicity on our own terms. This attitude is fitting for a
culture that seems to want it all, and that has come to believe in many
ways that it can have it all.74

This is reflected in the polls showing that while Americans value
freedom of information online,75 at the same time they want their
information protected.76 While this may seem a tad naïve, the
legal system may be able to relieve some of this tension if it can
move past the idea that the right to be forgotten is incompatible
with free speech because it conflicts with privacy law.
The many theories of free speech conflict with the right to
privacy, leading many people to incorrectly conclude that free
speech and the right to be forgotten are “irreconcilable,”77 and many
others to more correctly conclude that, as privacy law stands now,
it is powerless in the face of an assertion of free speech rights.78
Consider two theories scholars cite to reify free speech, both of
which leave little space for the privacy concerns of individuals: the
self-fulfillment theory and the self-governance theory.79 The selffulfillment theory posits that restricting access to information
inhibits a person’s innate ability to form opinions, framing the
issue in terms of an individual’s right to know information.80 The
self-governance theory, while couched in language about “relevant”
information, leaves the public in charge of deciding what is
relevant to keep them informed, which undervalues any concerns
of the individual.81 And, as has been established, the public
indiscriminately seeks information about others at the expense of
individual privacy concerns.82

BARBAS, supra note 28, at 191.
Id. at 201.
75 See Purcell & Rainie, supra note 16.
76 See Madden & Rainie, supra note 19.
77 Larson III, supra note 57, at 120.
78 Bartholomew, supra note 35, at 792 (“[A]ny court weighing . . . individual
injury against the broader societal interest in free speech will always find the latter more
compelling.”).
79 Larson III, supra note 57, at 119–20.
80 Id. at 110–12.
81 Id. at 114–17.
82 Purcell & Rainie, supra note 16.
73
74
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The extent to which the development of these theories is a
combination of historical contingency and Supreme Court
jurisprudence—as opposed to populist American values—is worth
noting. Suffice to say that starting in the 1940s with the famous
Sidis case,83 the Supreme Court has “favor[ed] the interests of the
press [and the right of free speech] at the cost of almost any claim
to privacy.”84 Contrast this with polls that show the vast majority
of Americans have a strong interest in having some control over
who can access information about them.85 Clearly, the right to be
forgotten may be more antithetical to the press and the courts than
to the average American, and jurists and commentators must
develop strategies to deal with these conflicting interests.
B.

The Problems of Defining Privacy and Forcing
“Reprivatization”

Compounding the problem of pitting privacy against free
speech is the fact that a useful definition of privacy continues to
elude American courts. Many commentators have noted how
difficult it has been to define privacy.86 This struggle to define
the term may have done more harm than good, as the different
frameworks the courts have applied to try to distinguish
between what should and should not be protected has resulted
in a woefully complicated and muddled analytical process. The
Supreme Court has tried to draw the line “between negligence
and actual malice, public figures and private citizens, and public
concerns and private interests to guide lower courts,”87 but none
of these have been helpful88 and, for all their nuances, the Court
still favors free speech and the press over the privacy of
individuals in nearly every instance.89
There also exists a semantic issue in conceptualizing the
right to be forgotten as a privacy right, as the information covered
by the right to be deindexed was at one point legitimately
deprivatized. How can you force people to forget what they already
know? As Meg Leta Jones, a person who frames the right to be
forgotten in terms of a kind of “digital reinvention,” noted, “privacy
torts are not entirely relevant to the goal of digital reinvention as
Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
Whitman, supra note 11, at 1209.
85 Madden & Rainie, supra note 19.
86 Whitman, supra note 11, at 1153; see, e.g., JONES, supra note 26, at 56–57;
William B. Meany, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
253, 255 (1966).
87 JONES, supra note 26, at 56–57 (citations omitted).
88 Id. at 57.
89 Whitman, supra note 11, at 1209.
83

84
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they address false impressions or the improper disclosure of
information, whereas digital reinvention relates to the invasion
that results from continued access to personal information.”90 The
problem of “reprivatization” is that it frames the issue in terms of
asking us to forget, as opposed to making information harder to
discover after a period of continued, legitimate access.91
This understandable mental barrier to granting a right to
be forgotten via a privacy right has, unfortunately, played out in
the courtroom. Known as the “secrecy paradigm,” this is the idea,
ubiquitous in U.S. courts, that “information is either completely
private or completely public. Accordingly, once information is
released into the public domain, it is no longer private.”92 This is
clearly evoked in cases such as Nunez v. Pachman,93 where the
Third Circuit held that despite the defendant’s criminal record
expungement, he did not have a privacy right in the record.94 The
court stated that no constitutional right limited disclosure of the
criminal record because the information could never really be
private by virtue of having been previously released.95 Under
Nunez-type facts, questions of privacy involving public information
do not even fall within the ambit of the fundamental right to
privacy guaranteed by Griswold. Technically, the court is right
that it cannot reprivatize information that has already legitimately
entered the public domain, although at the same time the semantic
quibble that the court in Nunez pins their holding on—namely,
that public information can never be private—does come across as
intellectually disingenuous.
It may be impossible to really reprivatize a matter of
public record, but it is possible to remove a link and therefore
make a matter less easily found. This requires a shift away from
the bright line rule of the “secrecy paradigm” and towards a
focus on a standard that weighs privacy concerns through a lens
of accessibility.96 Such a shift is far from unheard of in the United
States—it happens all the time with copyrighted material.97

JONES, supra note 26, at 58.
See Selinger & Hartzog, supra note 45.
92 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 150 (2008).
93 Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2009).
94 Ashley Messenger, What Would a “Right to Be Forgotten” Mean for Media in
the United States?, 29 COMM. LAW. 29, 32 (2012).
95 Nunez, 578 F.3d at 231.
96 SOLOVE, supra note 92, at 151.
97 See JONES, supra note 26, at 57. For example, Section 512 of the Copyright
Act provides that, inter alia, internet service providers must remove or block access to
any material that is posted without the copyright owner’s authorization, upon being
notified. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b-d) (2012). So, say a person uploads a newscast without the
permission of the copyright owner onto YouTube. Although this video may add to the
90

91
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Much copyrighted material may very well contain content one
might expect to be protected by free speech, but the United
States recognizes an overriding right in the interest of the
copyright holder.98 From a purely instinctive standpoint, it
hardly seems to be a logical leap to go from a copyright allowing
for the removal of content to a qualified right to publicity
allowing for the deindexing of links. Still, the law is not always
instinctive—sometimes for good reason, sometimes just due to
historical contingency. Either way, framing the issue in terms of
a right to publicity does not present the semantic issue played
out in real life that reprivatization does.
C.

The Silent Stakeholder in the Debate: Search Engines

So far the major players in the discussion of the right to
be forgotten have been the courts, the media, and the public. But
any discussion of the right to be forgotten—and in particular,
the right to deindex—cannot frame search engines as the ball
with which these stakeholders are playing. Rather, search
engines are an active and very influential player with their own
preferences, and though those preferences are legitimate, they
may not align with the majority of American citizens. It should
be noted that when discussing search engines one is really
talking about Google, which currently holds a 75 percent market
share in the search engine business and the second-largest
market share for an English-language search engine amounting
to a mere 8 percent.99 As discussed in Part IV, Google’s business
plan creates an incentive for the corporation to favor free speech
over privacy—although this preference stems more likely from
economic concerns rather than any sort of belief in the value of
a robust public discourse.100 But in order to lay the groundwork
for why this preference matters, it is necessary to look at just
how powerful and influential Google is.

corpus of information on the Internet and therefore constitute free speech, it is not
protected from removal under the Copyright Act. Id.
98 See Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment
Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1192–93 (1970) (“I
would conclude . . . it appears that the idea-expression line represents an acceptable
definitional balance as between copyright and free speech interests. In some degree it
encroaches upon freedom of speech in that it abridges the right to reproduce the
‘expression’ of others, but this is justified by the greater public good in the copyright
encouragement of creative works.”).
99 Search Engine Market Share, NETMARKETSHARE, https://netmarketshare.com/
[https://perma.cc/748A-5NZ9] (data collected on Feb. 28, 2016).
100 See infra Part IV.
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Google “spends more than $15 million per year on direct
lobbying” in Washington101 and has succeeded in a mind-boggling
amount of “regulatory capture,” whereby regulated companies
effectively take over the agencies that regulate them.102 Among other
examples, “Google chairman Eric Schmidt visited the Obama White
House more than any other corporate executive in America,” the
“[United States’s] chief technology officer . . . [is a] former Google
employee,” and “[t]he director of United States Digital Service . . . is
a former Google employee.”103 On top of these examples, there are
the “revolving door” moves out of the government and into Google,
suggesting that those in the government who play nicely with the
company will be rewarded once their tenure in public service ends.
During the Obama presidency alone, the independent watchdog
group Google Transparency Project found 258 discrete “revolving
door” movements between Google and the federal government or
political campaigns.104
But as Jonathan Taplin, director emeritus of the
Annenberg Innovation Lab at the University of Southern
California, noted, a lot of Google’s employee’s lobbying efforts
involve using the platform itself to lobby the public at no cost. As
an example, Taplin cites the debate surrounding the Stop Online
Piracy Act (SOPA), which “targeted search engines . . . that link to
pirate sites.”105 The day after Congress introduced the bill, Google’s
homepage showed their logo with a black box over it containing the
words “Tell Congress: Please don’t censor the web!”106 As Taplin
points out, “[t]he very notion that getting Google to stop linking to
pirate sites constitutes censorship is an exercise in Orwellian
doublespeak.”107 But, as explored in Part V,108 Google has very real
economic incentives to engage in this kind of doublespeak, and by
discounting their influence, the public risks characterizing Google
as a benign entity swept up in an ideological tug-of-war in the
debate over the right to be forgotten.

101 JONATHAN TAPLIN, MOVE FAST AND BREAK THINGS: HOW FACEBOOK,
GOOGLE, AND AMAZON CORNERED CULTURE AND UNDERMINED DEMOCRACY 127 (2017).
102 Id. at 128.
103 Id. at 128–29.
104 Google’s Revolving Door (US), GOOGLE TRANSPARENCY PROJECT, https://google
transparencyproject.org/articles/googles-revolving-door-us [https://perma.cc/CA25-JJYY].
105 TAPLIN, supra note 101, at 127.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 128.
108 See infra Part V.
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DEFINING THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY

Perhaps in part because the right to publicity does not live
at a problematic intersection between the two core American
values of free speech and privacy, it has not been subject to
unhelpful judicial ratiocinations and is therefore easier to define. A
good general definition states: “The publicity right . . . creates a
property interest in elements of personal identity, allowing
individuals . . . to exert legal control over when, whether and how
their various personal characteristics . . . can be used by others for
commercial ends.”109 This definition on its own, however, does not
give the full picture of the right nor does it justify the right’s
existence. This Part first looks at how the modern right to publicity
stems from privacy torts, and how, in a sense, “privacy and
publicity [are] really two sides of the same coin.”110 The Part then
explores the salient difference between modern privacy and
publicity rights that makes a right to be forgotten vis-à-vis
publicity right more palatable to American jurists, namely, that
privacy rights are framed in terms of emotional harm while
publicity rights are framed in terms of economic harm.
A.

History of the Right to Publicity

The history of the right to publicity begins with Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s Harvard Law Review article, The
Right to Privacy.111 Dubbed “that most influential law review
article of all,”112 the article was an effort to introduce Europeanstyle privacy laws into the United States, targeting the
pernicious new phenomenon of yellow journalism.113 Ultimately,
though, the article took a defeatist attitude towards adopting
European-style privacy and publicity protections,114 and while
many of their suggestions have been incorporated into U.S. law,

109 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right to Publicity?,
9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 35, 36 (1998) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
110 BARBAS, supra note 28, at 43.
111 Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
112 Harvey Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
113 Whitman, supra note 11, at 1204. Whitman points out in a footnote that this
was not necessarily a new phenomenon, as newspapers had been in the business of
society reporting for a long time before the turn of the nineteenth century—the difference
during the 1890s being that newspaper now had a mass audience. Id. at 1204 n.263
(citations omitted).
114 Whitman, supra note 11, at 1207.
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in practice the right of privacy vis-à-vis a right to publicity that
they envisioned is inconsequential.115
Before the mid-twentieth century, if any protection was
granted to a person’s “personality,” it was through privacy law.116
Initially, the law viewed publicity as a corollary to privacy, as an
invasion of privacy also suggests undesired visibility resulting from
an invasion into a personal matter.117 But wave after wave of
technology innovations placed more focus on the different nuances
of privacy. For example, does a company that uses your image
really invade on your right to privacy? This would seem to run into
the issue of “reprivatization,” since your image—assuming you are
not a hermit—is a matter of public record, so to speak.
The mass media and celebrity culture surrounding the
“privacy panic” of the 1950s proved to be the tipping point and
the decade yielded a legal interest in a distinct “right to profit
from the commercial exploitation of one’s image—the right to
sell one’s image as personal property.”118 Put another way, courts
began to recognize “the inherent right of every human being to
control the commercial use of his or her identity.”119 Thus, the
right to privacy and the right to publicity were split in twain,
although they both continued to wrestle with similar issues
surrounding personal autonomy.
One of the first cases to recognize the right to publicity
was the 1953 Second Circuit decision Haelan Laboratories v.
Topps Chewing Gum,120 where the court explicitly recognized the
different interests that justify splitting privacy rights along the
lines of privacy and publicity.121 Topps had an exclusive contract
with a baseball player to use his image in connection with their
gum, and Topps sued when their competitor, Haelan, began to
use the ballplayer’s image on their gum.122 Haelan maintained
that a person “has no legal interest in the publication of his [or
her] picture other than his [or her] right to privacy,”123 with the
Id. at 1204.
See Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of
the Associative Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1215–23 (1986); see also
BARBAS, supra note 28 at 4 (“Long before it offered protection against unauthorized data
collection, government spying, or intrusion into one’s private space, the right to privacy
was the right to control one’s public image, and to be compensated for emotional distress
when the media interfered with one’s own, desired public persona.”).
117 See BARBAS, supra note 28, at 34.
118 See id. at 184–85.
119 See Gloria Franke, Note, The Right of Publicity vs. the First Amendment: Will
One Test Ever Capture the Starring Role?, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 945, 945 (2006) (quoting J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2006)).
120 Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d 868.
121 Id. at 868.
122 Id. at 867.
123 Id. at 868.
115
116
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implication being that privacy torts only protect images in
connection with the disclosure of private information. But the
court rejected this theory, stating that “in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy . . . a man [or woman] has a
right in the publicity value of his [or her] photograph.”124 The
court recognized that different interests were at stake with
regard to privacy and publicity, and just what those interests
were will be discussed later in this Section.
Since Haelan, a case decided under New York law, the
right to publicity has been developed as state law.125 The right
varies in definition as well as in applicability, but bellwether
states in this matter have well-defined rights of publicity and
thus the variable definitions of the law throughout the states do
not create a barrier to a broad application of the right across the
country. As of today, “only about a dozen [states] have taken
unambiguous steps to create a true property right [of publicity]
while most others continue to offer protections for personality
that are either indistinguishable from, or actually still governed
by, the rules of older privacy tort of commercial appropriation.”126
States that do have a well-defined right of publicity, including
New York and California,127 are influential centers of mass
media and they are likely to deal with some of the more salient
questions surrounding the right to be forgotten. Therefore, the
fact that many states still do not have a well-defined publicity
right does not negatively affect the thesis of this note, and in fact
may help avoid the jurisprudential morass the over-defined
right to privacy now exists in.
B.

The Modern Right of Publicity, an Economic Right

The modern right of publicity provides a more ideal right
to achieve the goal of importing the right to be forgotten to the
United States, largely because of the economic interests
inherent in it as a property right. The right of publicity
recognizes an economic interest in the commercial use of a
person’s name or image,128 and therefore makes the right more
palatable to the U.S. legal system. Put bluntly, the U.S. legal
system understands and sympathizes with monetary injustice
Id.
See Zimmerman, supra note 109, at 41, n.19. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. CocaCola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App. 1975); Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868; 765 Ill.
Comp. Stat. 1075/1 et seq. (1999); Cal. Civ. Code § 3344 (West 1971).
126 Zimmerman, supra note 109, at 41–42.
127 Id.
128 Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
124
125
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more than emotional distress. The court in Haelan recognized that
the right to privacy, conceived as a protection against emotional
harm, is a different beast than a right to publicity, stating that “it
is common knowledge that many prominent persons . . . far from
having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received
money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains
and subways.”129 The right of publicity is useful in this regard, not
only for framing individual rights in terms of monetary incentives,
but also for externalizing the harm a person might incur if someone
were to, say, index a link on a search engine. The right of publicity
makes the deindexing assessment more objective by placing the
locus of the analysis on external economic harm instead of internal
psychological harm.
The idea of framing an essentially moral issue in terms
of economic rights is not unprecedented in the United States. For
example, the scholarly work surrounding the United States
joining an international copyright treaty provides insight into
how European moral ideals sometimes need to be translated into
American dollar signs.130 In order to comply with the multilateral
Berne Convention,131 the United States had to recognize certain
moral rights of creators, whereas the Copyright Act only
protected monetary rights of a copyright holder.132 Congress
pushed back against the adoption of moral rights for copyright
owners, citing common law principles of unfair competition and
breach of contract, as well as the Lanham Act § 43(a), which
codified the federal law of unfair competition,133 arguing that the
Copyright Act already covers moral rights, though it frames
coverage in terms of economic incentives.134 While, in the end,
Congress did make limited concessions to the moral rights
provisions of the Berne Convention for a some works,135 it did so
129 Id. at 868; see also Canessa, 235 A.2d at 66 (“Although the element of
protection of the plaintiff’s personal feelings is obviously not to be ignored in such a case,
the effect of the appropriation decisions is to recognize or create an exclusive right in the
individual plaintiff to a species of trade name.”) (internal citations omitted).
130 See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, 1 MARQ. INTELL.
PROP. L. REV. 1, 3 (1997) [hereinafter Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA]; Roberta
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38
VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) [hereinafter Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right].
131 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, 25 U.S.T. 1341 (as revised and amended Sept. 28, 1979).
132 Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right, supra note 130, at 2.
133 Kwall, How Fine Art Fares Post VARA, supra note 130, at 3 n.15.
134 Id. at 3.
135 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2012) (granting a right to the author of a work of visual
art to claim authorship and prevent use of their name in any work they did not create).
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in the “narrowest possible manner” by reframing moral rights in
terms of economic guarantees against unfair competition.136 This
example is not given to endorse Congress sidestepping stronger
moral rights, but to illustrate how effective framing legal rights
in terms of economic incentives can be in the United States.
Beyond its use as a more tangible economic right,
framing the right to be forgotten in terms of an economic right
is also useful to help distinguish between the liability of the
search engine and the liability of the source website, that is, the
media. Search engines have different economic incentives from
source websites that “are not necessarily interchangeable.”137 A
search engine is an archival service that deals in the quality of
search results, whereas generally speaking, a webpage deals in
quality of information. Their different purposes create different
economic incentives that necessitate treating search engines
and source pages as separately liable.138 This idea harkens back
to the distinction between the right to deletion and the right to
deindex, as the former would negatively affect the source page
but not the search engine (what does Google care if they have
one fewer link?), while the latter would potentially affect Google
but not the source page (Google has a legitimate interest in
making existing, available information searchable).
IV.

CAN AN ORGANIC SEARCH RESULT BE PROPERLY
CHARACTERIZED AS A COMMERCIAL END?

Underpinning this analysis of economic interests is the
question: can a link in Google’s search results, part of a free
service that does not directly profit from organic search results,
be characterized as a “commercial end” per the right to publicity?
The answer is yes. An overview of the relevant statutes and case
law reveals that a “commercial end” can best be understood as
any unconsented profit derived from using an aspect of a
person’s identity in which they have a commercial interest.139
According to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, a
person’s identity is used for a “commercial end” when, inter alia,
136 Kenneth D. Crews, Looking Ahead and Shaping the Future: Provoking
Change in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 549, 559 (2001).
137 Stute, supra note 41, at 670–71.
138 Id. at 671.
139 The definition from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition gets
close to a concise definition by framing the commercial use in terms of the remedy
available: “One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s identity by using
without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and
49.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (AM. LAW. INST. 1995).
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it is “placed on merchandise marketed by the user, or [is] used
in connection with services rendered by the user.”140 Put another
way, this means that even if a service like Google does not
directly profit from a single link, it may profit by virtue of it
being connected to its service. And insofar as there is a dollarsand-cents profit from any particular link, the amount that
Google profits from the link may be small, but even so ordinary
people may obtain monetary or injunctive relief from Google
under the right of publicity, no matter how little their name or
image is worth, as long as it has a commercial value that
someone else exploited for a commercial end.141
When a person types in a search query on Google, two
things appear on the results page: advertisements and organic
search results. The advertisements come from AdWords,142
“Google’s auction-based advertising program” that helps Google
deliver relevant ads for any search query.143 If the URL has this
icon next to it, it means (1) that the website has outbid their
competitors for the spot, and (2) the website pays Google each
time a visitor clicks on an advertisement.144 These ads appear
first in the search results and are indicated by an icon to the left
of the URL that says “Ad.” And while it really should not matter
how much money Google makes off its search engine service,
seeing that any commercial value is enough to trigger a right of
publicity,145 the fact that Google has its fingers in so many pies—
phones, books, music, paid content on YouTube, cloud services,
virtual reality technology, watches146—does beg the question of
whether they are really profiting from the search engines or just
using its other products to subsidize the search engine. “In 2014,
[Google] generated approximately 90 [percent] of its revenues
from advertising, with just over two thirds of” revenue derived
from advertisements that show up in search engine results.147 In
sum, the paid-for advertisements are most definitely a
Id. § 47.
See Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 235 A.2d 62, 75 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967).
142 Google AdWords, GOOGLE, https://adwords.google.com/home/?channel=ha&
sourceid=awo&subid=us-en-ha-aw-bkhv-kwd-12340353-103694651885&gclid=CJPM7DukdACFcVBhgodq_4Jdw#?modal_active=none [https://perma.cc/C7A7-GFB4].
143 Shiv Mehta, How Google’s Search Engine Makes Money, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug.
13, 2015, 9:33 AM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/081315/how-googlessearch-engine-makes-money.asp [https://perma.cc/22L8-YNPJ].
144 See Eric Rosenberg, The Business of Google (GOOG), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 13, 2017,
2:48 PM), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/020515/business-google.asp [https://
perma.cc/F9VV-ARM4].
145 Canessa, 235 A.2d at 75.
146 See
Products, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en_US/about/products/
[https://perma.cc/9SEB-BBS7]; Google Store, GOOGLE, https://store.google.com/?hl=en&ut
m_source=SE&utm_medium=AGP&utm_campaign=HP [https://perma.cc/K6CE-JMF8].
147 Mehta, supra note 143.
140
141
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commercial end because they directly generate ad revenue for
Google every time someone clicks on the link.
The websites indexed below the ads, however, do not use
AdWords and do not pay Google for clicks, and while this requires
some analysis to determine how they can be considered part of
Google’s “commercial end,” the analytical puzzle is really quite
simple. The links indexed below the ads, called “organic search
results,” are the result of a process wherein Google automatically
crawls internet pages and sorts them based on content, as well as
more than 200 other factors.148 When a person types in a search
query, Google uses the information it has collected and organized
to deliver results based solely on relevance,149 as opposed to the ads
which are based on both relevance and out-bidding competitors.
Google does not directly profit from these links, as websites do not
pay for organic search results.150
But while Google does not directly profit from a person
clicking on an organic search link, organic results are part and
parcel with the search engine’s service and, therefore, part of the
commercial end that includes AdWords. As Clancy Clarke noted:
Search engines have a reason to maintain quality organic search
results—the better the organic search results for a given query the more
likely a user will return to use the search engine again. The more users a
search engine has the larger the possible audience there is for the paid
advertising and hence the more revenue the search engine receives.151

Without the organic search results, Google’s search engine is a
much lesser product. If Google only provided advertisements, there
would be fewer people using their service and fewer people clicking
on the ads. The organic results are necessarily part of Google’s
commercial end that Google is exploiting to make a profit.
The organic search results, however, are not purely
commercial in nature, and therefore further analysis is
necessary to deal with the tension between having an organic
result that is both part of a commercial end but also links to an
article that has legitimate free speech protections. As previously
indicated, a service such as Google uses a person’s identity for a
“commercial end” when the identity in question is “placed on
merchandise marketed by the user, or [is] used in connection

148 How Search Works, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en_us/insidesearch/
howsearchworks/thestory/ [https://perma.cc/K7F7-8Z6S].
149 See id.
150 See id.
151 Clancy Clarke, How Do Search Engines Like Google Make Money?,
WEBCENTRAL BLOG (Nov. 11, 2011), https://www.webcentral.com.au/blog/how-do-searchengines-like-google-make-money/ [https://perma.cc/P2GH-XZ5M].
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with services rendered by the user.”152 Organic links could be
understood both as being “placed on merchandise” (i.e., the
search engine) and as being “used in connection with” their
service (i.e., providing search results). Therefore, the organic
links can be understood as part and parcel with their ad revenue
by virtue of its essential connection to the product which
generates the ad revenue.
Granted, there is something that seems almost crass
about defining an organic link as a “commercial end,” since the
right to be forgotten conflicts with the First Amendment, and
under First Amendment jurisprudence “commercial speech” is
not as strongly protected as other types of speech such.153 This
begs the question: does characterizing links as a “commercial
end” potentially diminish the free speech protections of any
particular link? The answer is no. First, “commercial end” is a
different standard than “commercial speech.”154 Whether
something constitutes commercial speech is an inquiry into
whether speech should be afforded less scrutiny than other
forms of expression, and focuses on the protection afforded to the
advertiser.155 Whether something is a misappropriation toward
a “commercial end” does not deal with the type of expression, but
rather is an inquiry into whether the advertiser has profited
from an expression, and focuses on the harm to a third party.
Still, while this note’s analysis does not implicate the
doctrine of commercial speech, some of the policy concerns about
the ways commercial speech is limited conceptualize an important
issue surrounding the right to be forgotten. Specifically, these
policy concerns help frame the issue of whether a right to be
forgotten, per this note’s analysis, would elide over issues of
freedom of speech by characterizing Google’s organic search results
as a “commercial end.” In a law review article on advertising,
commercial speech, and the First Amendment,156 Adam Thierer
provided a useful framework for thinking about consumer benefits
152 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: USE FOR PURPOSES OF
TRADE § 47 (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
153 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 562–63 (1980).
154 Compare Virgina State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (noting that the commercial speech doctrine allows the
government to regulate speech misleading or deceptive speech used as part of a
commercial transaction) with Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc, 202 F.2d
866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953) (noting that a commercial end in the context of the right of
publicity applies broadly to any appropriation of someone’s image as part of a commercial
transaction).
155 See Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563.
156 Adam Thierer, Advertising, Commercial Speech, and First Amendment
Parity, 5 CHARLESTON L. REV. 503, 507 (2011).
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that should be protected in considering whether to curb commercial
speech, which can be analogized to the user benefits to be protected
in characterizing an organic link as a “commercial end.” Thierer
looked to (1) the informational effects, (2) the effects on marketcompetition, and (3) the media promotion effects of commercial
speech, and stated that any adverse effect on these policies caused
by removing the speech from the public should be considered in
determining whether it should be protected under the umbrella of
free speech.157 For the purpose of this analysis, both the paid and
organic search results are considered “advertisements” in that they
both contribute, one directly and one indirectly, to Google’s ad
revenue.
With regard to informational effects, Thierer cited John
Calfee for the proposition that content supported by ad revenue
is an efficient way to bring information to consumers, creating
“enhanced incentives to create new information and develop
better products.”158 Under the theory of this note, the blow to the
corpus of available information online would be minimal.159
First, the number of links taken down from Google would be a
tiny fraction of the links that exist, as there are over 60 trillion
individual pages online,160 and since Google Spain, Google has
processed almost two million requests for deindexing, granting
about half a million of them.161 That’s 0.0000005 percent of the
total number of web pages online. Second, the links removed
have to be “no longer relevant,”162 a high bar to pass.
Thierer also noted that market-competitiveness effects should
be considered, as limiting the ability to advertise potentially decreases
the competitiveness of any service, since advertising “keeps markets
competitive by keeping competitors on their toes and forcing them to
Id.
Id. (quoting John E. Calfee, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON
ADVERTISING AND REGULATION 2 (1997)).
159 As of January 20, 2017, Google has taken down 683,793 links based on the
Google Spain decision. Search Removals Under European privacy law, GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removals/europeprivacy/
[https://perma.cc/F2DJ-7Z88]. To give a sense of how small a number this is compared to
the number of links online, there are more WordPress blog posts posted in two days than the
number of links Google has removed. See Victoria Woollaston, Revealed, what Happens in
Just ONE Minute on the Internet: 216,000 Photos Posted, 278,000 Tweets and 1.8m Facebook
Likes, DAILY MAIL (July 30, 2013, 10:39 A.M.), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article2381188/Revealed-happens-just-ONE-minute-internet-216-000-photos-posted-278-000Tweets-1-8m-Facebook-likes.html [https://perma.cc/6UNL-VTGT].
160 How Search Works, supra note 148.
161 Search Removals, supra note 159.
162 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española Protección de
Datos(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶93. http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document_
print.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=lst&docid=152065&occ=firs
t&dir=&cid=436018 [https://perma.cc/YB9C-VHCM].
157
158
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constantly respond to challenges by rivals who are offering better or
cheaper services. . . . [It] helps keep prices low (or even at zero) for
many goods and services, especially media and entertainment
offerings.”163 First, a right to be forgotten would affect all search
engines, not just Google, and so any decrease in competitiveness
would be felt across the board and therefore would have an equalizing
effect. But moreover, the minimal number of unsearchable links164
would not impact the quality of the search engine.
The final policy concern that Thierer flagged was that of
media promotion and content cross-subsidization, which he defined
as the benefits to society that advertisements create by “subsidizing
the creation of news, information, and entertainment.”165 As Google’s
advertisements do not directly subsidize any of the content
contained on source pages, this is not a concern.
V.

HOW A RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN AS A PUBLICITY RIGHT
WOULD WORK

Previous Parts have established that a right of publicity
would, in theory, work as a conceptual and legal framework for
a right to be forgotten in the United States, and this Part
addresses how the right to be forgotten would work in practice.
Having established that every link—either paid or organic—is
part of Google’s commercial end, and therefore the subject of any
particular link has a publicity interest in the link itself, this Part
refers generally to the right to deindex as if it were a publicity
right. It is also important to note that the affirmative right to
publicity would almost exclusively arise only if a third party
posted something over which the plaintiff had no control (e.g., a
newspaper).166 That is, if a person posts something himself, he
would have no standing to complain to Google or to seek
injunctive relief from them in the form of deindexing. This Part
first addresses the scope of the right and the standard for
determining whether someone can succeed on a right of publicity
clam to have a link deindexed. Then, it looks at the procedures
that may be put in place to deal with right to deindex claims.
Thierer, supra note 156, at 511 (citation omitted).
See Search Removals, supra text accompanying note 159.
165 Thierer, supra note 156, at 512.
166 Letter from Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel, Google, to Isabelle FalquePierrotin, Chair, Article 29 Working Party (July 31, 2014), https://docs.google.com/file/
d/0B8syaai6SSfiT0EwRUFyOENqR3M/preview [https://perma.cc/P769-9FZL] (“[I]f the data
in question was made public by the data subject, this is a factor to be considered in favor of
not removing a search result linking to such data. . . . In cases where we do not remove such
links, we advise the requester to use readily available tools to remove the content for
themselves.”).
163
164
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Finding a Standard for the Right to Be Forgotten

A good place to start is with Google Spain, which
contained a standard for determining whether a person has a
legitimate claim to have a link deindexed. The opinion looked at
whether, due to the passing of time, the information linked to in
an organic search result is “inadequate, irrelevant or no longer
relevant.”167 The CJEU stated that “even initially lawful
processing of accurate data may, in the course of time, become
incompatible with [EU standards] where those data are no
longer necessary in light of the purposes for which they were
collected or processed.”168 Contrary to popular perception, the
Google Spain decision was not a broad, sweeping blow to the
Internet as an archive of our lives. Rather, it created a “narrow,
fact-based” legal standard that can be successfully evoked only
in very limited circumstances.169
What counts as irrelevant is necessarily context-based,
as there can be strong privacy or publicity interests in
information that, on its face, is innocuous.170 For example, if Mr.
Costeja Gonzalez in Google Spain had habitually fallen into debt
after the articles appeared in the newspapers in 1998, such a
history of indebtedness might make all past financial troubles
relevant, as opposed to if it were just an isolated incident. Thus,
any hardline rule about what is and what is not subject to a
privacy interest is unhelpful and counterproductive.
Broadly speaking, the right to be forgotten requires an
inquiry into the extent to which the information contained on the
source page has depreciated over time. As Meg Leta Jones correctly
noted, “[t]hough the value of information is subjective, value can be
assigned when there is an action potentially influenced by the
information and the consequences of the action also can be
measured.”171 Using this metric, one may inquire into which actions
are “potentially influenced” to conduct a balancing test. Using the
Google Spain case as an example, the actions at stake are: (1) Mr.
Costeja Gonzalez’s potential ability to find gainful employment and
(2) the potential loss to the public knowledge from deindexing the
articles about the auction sale for his social security debt. Both
actions, however, turn on the same question of whether the
information is still accurate or relevant and therefore contributes
Google Spain, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 93.
Id.
169 David Hoffman, Paula Bruening & Sophia Carter, The Right to Obscurity:
How We Can Implement the Google Spain Decision, 17 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 437, 457 (2016).
170 E.g., Bartholomew, supra note 35, at 792, 775.
171 JONES, supra note 26, at 118.
167
168
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to the public knowledge. “The speed of depreciation [of information]
generally correlates to the relevance and accuracy of content.”172 It
would be easy to say that the auction sale notice became irrelevant
and inaccurate as soon as the auction ended, but that would be too
simple, as “[e]xpired information is that which is no longer an
accurate representation of the state of the subject or
communication,”173 so simply because the information is old does
not necessarily make it expired. For a period of time after the
auction, there was still a question of how long it remained relevant
that Mr. Costeja Gonzales was a debtor. Only once Mr. Costeja’s
history as a debtor was no longer an accurate representation of him
would that information be considered expired.
Narrowing the inquiry further, certain factors must be
established to try to draw the line between when a person’s right
of publicity succeeds against the freedom of knowledge concerns
inherent in online information. A good starting point to conduct
this analysis is the Guidelines on the Implementation of the
Court of Justice of the European Union Judgment on “Google
Spain and Inc v. Agencia Espanola de Datos (AEPD) and Mario
Costeja Gonzalez” C-131/12174 (the Guidelines), promulgated by
the Working Party, a group of privacy regulators from the EU’s
member states.175 The Guidelines provide thirteen “criteria” to
determine whether the information should be deindexed, noting
that “no single criterion is, in itself, determinative.”176
Insofar as it relates to the right to be forgotten as a
publicity right, and thus an economic right, there are several
useful criteria within the Guidelines. The first criterion looks at
whether “the search result relate[s] to a natural person,”177
which is relevant because the right of publicity is an individual
right.178 Another criterion looks at the role the subject plays in
public life, noting that while the term “public figure” is difficult
to define, “[a] good rule of thumb is to try to decide where the
public having access to the particular information . . . would
protect them against improper public or professional conduct.”179
While the Guidelines were released after Google Spain to
Id. at 118.
Id. at 124.
174 GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 12–20.
175 Article 29 Working Party, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 6, 2016), http://
ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/index_en.htm [https://perma.cc/LL4J-RAYX].
176 GUIDELINES, supra note 42.
177 Id. at 13.
178 See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d
Cir. 1953) (“[I]n addition to and independent of that right of privacy . . . a man [or
woman] has a right in the publicity value of his [or her] photograph.”).
179 GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 13.
172
173
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address the vagueness of certain aspects of the decision,180 one
could apply its definition of a public figure to ask whether
knowing that Mr. Costeja Gonzalez was subject to social-security
debt proceedings potentially protects the public against
improper conduct in his capacity as a lawyer. If so, maybe Google
Spain was decided incorrectly.
Other criteria in the Guidelines look at accuracy,
excessiveness, and relevancy,181 weighing these different factors to
establish whether the person’s interest in their right to be forgotten
is stronger than countervailing free speech interests. The Guidelines
treat accuracy as a factual issue, and look to whether the
information is incomplete, inadequate, or just wrong.182 There is an
obvious hierarchy within these categories as well, especially as
wrong information is less valuable to the public and therefore weighs
against free speech protection more than inadequate or incomplete
information, as these may even have a detrimental effects on the
public discourse.183 With regard to relevancy, the Guidelines look to
whether the public has a current interest “in having access to the
information,” stating that relevance is the inquiry relating most
directly to how long the information has existed.184 The inquiry into
excessiveness turns on whether the information contained in the
source is more than the public needs.185 The excessiveness criterion
is worth flagging, but it is probably wholly incompatible with
American free speech jurisprudence by virtue of the fact that the
problem of “newsworthiness” is a descriptive—as opposed to
normative—standard that is determined by the press and not the
Supreme Court.186
One final criterion worth mentioning is whether the
information causes disproportionate prejudice for the subject
asserting a right. This is the factor that most strongly relates to the
idea of the right to deindex as a property interest. By way of
example, the Working Party states that a search result “might have
a disproportionately negative impact on the data subject where a
search result relates to a trivial or foolish misdemeanor which is no
Carbone, supra note 10, at 539.
GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 15.
182 Id.
183 See Sabrina Tavernise, As Fake News Spreads Lies, More Readers Shrug at
the Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/us/fake-newspartisan-republican-democrat.html [https://perma.cc/UH2D-2AM3] (“Fake news, and
the proliferation of raw opinion that passes for news, is creating confusion, punching
holes in what is true, causing a kind of fun-house effect that leaves the reader doubting
everything, including real news.”).
184 GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 15.
185 Id. at 16.
186 Theodore L. Glasser, Resolving the Press-Privacy Conflict: Approaches to the
Newsworthiness Defense, in Privacy and Publicity 16–17 (Theodore R. Kupferman, ed. 1990).
180
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longer—or may never have been—the subject of public debate and
where there is no wider public interest in the availability of the
information.”187 To analyze the proportionality of the prejudice
present in Google Spain, a court would have had to weigh Mr.
Costeja Gonzalez’s loss of property in the form of not being able to
find a salaried job as a lawyer against the public interest in knowing
about his history of debt. In the United States especially, the current
limited ability to seek damages for “disproportionate truthful
information,” such as nude photo leaks, “often leads to strange
results”188 that a right to deindex could mitigate. In the case of nude
photo leaks, there are certain laws that protect the owner’s copyright
in the photo, but “prosecuting the data thief does not fully mitigate
the harm to the victim if search engines and data brokers will
continue to direct people to the content forever.”189 Worth noting,
though, is that the laws that do exist to protect the owners of the
nude photos are framed in terms of intellectual property,190 so it may
not be such a stretch to extend this intellectual property right to a
person’s inherent right in their identity.
This list of criteria is not exhaustive, and moreover many
of the other criteria in the Guidelines are not compatible with
the idea of a right to deindex as a publicity right. They are,
however, a useful framework for conceptualizing how the right
to be forgotten would work in practice. Other criteria American
courts could look at for guidance include weighing the social
benefit of having a link deindexed191 (for example, making
someone employable), and inquiring whether the public is likely
to search for the information or just a specific individual.192
Suffice it to say that there is no dearth of criteria to help define
the right to be forgotten so it is both narrow and useful.
B.

Procedural Enforcement of the Right to Be Forgotten

Having established that there are certain criteria that
should be considered in whether a right to be forgotten could
succeed, it is necessary to establish that the practical concerns over
defining the scope of the right can be implemented in a satisfying
way. Evidence from the way the Google Spain ruling has been
implemented suggests that this is possible.193 Moreover, other
GUIDELINES, supra note 42, at 18.
Hoffman, Bruening & Carter, supra note 169, at 476.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 See JONES, supra note 26, at 132.
192 See id.
193 Google has developed a process to review links. See Requests to Remove
Content: Frequently Asked Questions, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/transparency
187
188
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Google practices show that they are already implementing selfimposed policies that will deindex sites for reasons other than
compliance with a right to be forgotten, deindexing links to “sites
[that] do not meet Google’s quality guidelines.”194 Under these
guidelines, links may be removed based on dubious behavior such
as spamming without any concern for free speech195—Google is,
after all, a private business and therefore not liable for chilling the
free speech of its users.196 Therefore, a procedure that implements
the right to be forgotten in the United States is feasible from
practical, policy, and legal perspectives.
The subject-to-controller takedown system, rather than a
subject-to-courtroom takedown system that the EU established to
deal with right to be forgotten claims, is a useful template to
imagine how the right to be forgotten might be implemented in the
United States. “In a perfect world, conflicts involving fundamental
rights would always be decided by a court of law[, since a]n
impartial judiciary offers the strongest warranty that the interests
at stake are properly balanced.”197 But this is not a perfect world
and it is unlikely that the court system would be able to handle the
volume of right to be forgotten claims were the right recognized in
the United States. The “subject-to-controller” system puts Google
in the position of the main arbiter of right to be forgotten claims.198
The process involves filling out a form199 and then Google reviewing
the form by “balanc[ing] the privacy rights of the individual with
the public’s interest to know and the right to distribute
information.”200 This process may be more ideal because it is “more
efficient than having to go through an administrative or judicial
proceeding.”201 It also avoids the so-called “Streisand effect”—the
phenomenon that occurs when someone tries to hide or remove a
report/removals/europeprivacy/faq/?hl=en#who_may_request [https://perma.cc/A8UWZXY6]. This process has resulted in almost 2 million links reviewed and more than
600,000 deindexings. Search Removals, supra note 159.
194 Site Removed from the Google Index, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/
webmasters/answer/40052?hl=en [https://perma.cc/XZ6B-WL7X]. For a list of the
guidelines Google uses in removing links that do not meet “quality guidelines,” see
Webmaster Guidelines, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/webmasters/answer/35769
[https://perma.cc/RN8J-X3H5].
195 See Webmaster Guidelines, supra note 194.
196 See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 815 F.3d. 1145, 1156 n.5 (9th Cir. 2016)
(“No authority supports the recovery of nominal damages caused by a private actor’s
chilling of free speech rights.”).
197 Aleksandra Kuczerawy & Jef Ausloos, From Notice-and-Takedown to Noticeand-Delist: Implementing Google Spain, 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 219, 243(2016).
198 See JONES, supra note 26, at 43.
199 Search Removal Request Under Data Protection Law in Europe, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/legal/contact/lr_eudpa?product=websearch [https://perma.cc/
3WUP-5C5R].
200 Id.
201 See JONES, supra note 26, at 43–44.
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piece of information, thus drawing attention to that information
and resulting in wider circulation than would have occurred
otherwise.202 After an initial spike in people asserting the right to
be forgotten in the wake of Google Spain, the number “of requests
has settled into about 1,000 requests per day,”203 which has proven
manageable for the company. If a person disagrees with Google’s
decision, they may “request that a local data protection authority
review [the] decision,”204 which is necessary given that the right to
publicity is a legally enforceable right and not just a policy that
Google needs to adopt.
While this process places some burden on Google,
evidence suggests that the process would not unduly prejudice
the search engine. For one thing, Google has already proven to
be capable of handling the requests from the twenty-eight EU
member states.205 And moreover, they already handle a large
volume of spam, both through automatic means and through
manual means.206 Some months they manually remove more
than 500,000 links.207 Google has no compunctions about
deindexing links whose source pages contain “unnatural links,”
“automatically generated content,” or “parked domains,”208 and
has put the infrastructure in place to deal with them.209
Certain procedures outside of Google’s current model also
indicate that a subject-to-controller system of enforcing the right
to be forgotten would not be beyond the pale for Google. The
subject-to-controller system established by the EU after Google
Spain uses a process similar to the one already used in the
United States with the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).210 The DMCA has clear procedures for removal and
replacement of content, requirements for notice and counternotice, and sanctions for misrepresentations.211 Wikipedia also
“has a deletion policy that results in five thousand pages being
deleted each day, one reason being lack of ‘notability.’”212 In sum,
202 See Justin Parkinson, The Perils of the Streisand Effect, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE
(July 31, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28562156 [https://perma.cc/2WJQ-EVFA].
203 See JONES, supra note 26, at 46.
204 Requests to Remove Content: Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 193.
205 Search Removals, supra note 159.
206 Fighting Spam, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en_us/insidesearch/
howsearchworks/fighting-spam.html [https://perma.cc/U73U-FVDM].
207 See id.
208 Id.
209 See Webmaster Guidelines, supra note 194.
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there are procedures that exist to deal with a right to be
forgotten in the United States that have proven manageable.
CONCLUSION
In closing, it is perhaps useful to keep in mind that
“[w]hether you like it or not, the EU is setting the standards of
privacy protection for the rest of the world.”213 After the CJEU’s
ruling in Google Spain, “Google extended the ‘right [to be
forgotten]’ to Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.”214
In addition, Hong Kong has officially begun to lobby Google for a
similar right, while similar efforts occur in Canada, Russia, South
Korea, and South Africa.215 This is not to say that a right to be
forgotten is a total inevitability in the United States, but as an
international actor, it is something that is going to come up and
something that the United States should be prepared to deal with
in a way that satisfies the international community.
Taking a defeatist attitude and treating the right to be
forgotten as an inevitability, however, misses the point that
acknowledging the right to be forgotten would be socially
beneficial. The right to be forgotten, characterized as a right of
publicity, could be a tool for analyzing and redrawing the
boundaries between these two core American ideals—or at the
very least help the right to be forgotten get its foot in the door in
the United States.
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